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This paper is an attempt to describe and exhibit the main features of the Brazilian tax 
system from 1980 to 2004.  In the selected period, the Brazilian economy experienced a 
faulty economic growth process in the presence of very high rates of inflation. 
In essence, what is shown here is significant upward movement of the total tax 
revenue in the country from a level of 25 percent of GDP to an all time high of 32.8 
percent in 2004. In addition it is argued that this effort to raise additional revenue 
occurred in the 1990s and is primarily explained by social security expenditures and by 
interest payments on public debt. 
The data collected also indicate that the tax system is dominated by indirect forms 
of taxation. The use of taxes on goods and services represented near 50 percent of the 
total tax revenue for most of the period. 
The paper identifies the key changes in the tax laws in the period and the current 
problems of design and administration of the tax system. 
Finally the macroeconomic context is presented and an attempt is made to relate the 
ups and down in the rates of economic activity and inflation to tax revenues and internal 




The twenty-five years that elapsed from 1980 to 2004 were characterized by significant 
changes in the Brazilian tax structure and in the amount of money that the three levels of 
government diverted from private use through taxation.  
The tax system that had been in place in the early 1980s was designed in a tax 
reform implemented from 1965-672. This reform promoted major changes, the most 
important being the introduction of value-added taxation. This new mode of taxation 
came to replace two cumulative taxes: the IVC, which was the backbone of the states’ 
revenue, and the misnamed federal “consumption” tax  which in reality taxed all sales 
within the industrial sector and imports in general. In addition, the 1965-67 tax reform 
revitalized, or perhaps more appropriately, truly instituted income taxation in Brazil with 
the implementation of modern tax administration procedures. 3 
During the late 1960s, the Brazilian public sector raised revenues equivalent to 25 
percent of GDP with the use of a dozen taxes and three contributions.4 This picture 
changed as time progressed, however. The tax system of the 1980s had essentially 
remained unchanged from the system implemented in the late 1960s. New demands for 
expenditures, mainly in the social area, however, brought forth a new federal 
contribution, FINSOCIAL, in 1982. In addition, a new state tax (IPVA) was created in 
1986, based on ownership of automobiles and other means of transportation.5  
In 1988, the picture shifted even further, as Brazil enacted a new constitution.  
Despite the fact that the Constitution was successful in terms of the construction of 
democratic values and institutions, it failed to construct an effective tax system. It should 
be recognized, however, that the Constitution improved the taxation of goods and 
services by eliminating federal excises on fuel, electricity, minerals, communications and 
interstate transportation, and by incorporating the corresponding tax bases in the ICMS (a 
VAT which is the main source of revenue of the states). 
To summarize briefly, the new constitution reinstated the tax structure that existed 
in 19886 and added four new taxes and contributions: a local tax on the retail sale of fuel, 
a state personal income tax, a federal wealth tax, and a federal social contribution on 
profits (CSLL). With the exception of CSLL, the other new taxes were abandoned in a 
few years for a variety of reasons.  
In 2002, the Brazilian government implemented a federal fuel tax (a contribution 
earmarked for road maintenance and construction) and a (provisional) bank debit tax for 
the fiscal year of 1994 (IPMF), which later was transformed in contribution (CPMF) to 
finance heath care. 
The main taxes and contributions collected in 2004 by the federal government, 
states, and municipalities are shown in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1. Main Taxes and Contributions in Brazil, 2004 
 
Level of Government and Taxes R$ million % GDP % Total
 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 442,280 22.78 69.72 
   FISCAL BUDGET 155,855 8.03 24.57 
Income Tax 110,308 5.68 17.39 
IPI (VAT Industry) 22,538 1.16 3.55 
Import Tax 9,181 0.47 1.45 
IOF (Loans, foreign exchange, and 
       insurance tax) 
5,209 0.27 0.82 
ITR (Rural Property) 245 0.01 0.04 
CIDE (Fuel Tax) 7,816 0.40 1.23 
Others 558 0.03 0.09 
   SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET 246,466 12.69 38.85 
Social Security Contribution  93,765 4.83 14.78 
COFINS (VAT)  77,593 4.00 12.23 
PIS/PASEP (VAT)  19,417 1.00 3.06 
CPMF (Financial Transactions) 26,340 1.36 4.15 
CSLL  (Contribution on Net Profits) 19,575 1.01 3.09 
Others 9,776 0.50 1.54 
   NON CLASSIFIED 39,959 2.06 6.30 





Others 11,690 0.60 1.84 
 
STATES GOVERNMENTS 165,324 8.52 26.06 
ICMS (VAT)  138,275 7.12 21.80 
IPVA (Vehicles) 8,910 0.46 1.40 
ITCD (Inheritance Tax) 710 0.04 0.11 
Others  17,429 0.90 2.75 
 
MUNICIPALITES GOVERNMENTS 26,786 1.38 4.22 
ISS (Services) 9,682 0.50 1.53 
IPTU (Urban Property) 8,965 0.46 1.41 
ITBI (Property Transfer) 1,851 0.10 0.29 
Others 6,288 0.32 0.99 
TOTAL 634,390 32.77 100.00 
 
  Source: IBGE/FRS. 
  Note:  GDP (2004): R$ 1.9 trillion = US$ 663.6 billion. 
 
The data reveal that the federal government raised 69.72 percent of Brazil’s total 
revenue, while the states collected 26.06 percent and the municipalities raised the 
smallest fraction, 4.22 percent. 
Taxes and contributions collected by the federal government are divided to 
finance two independent budgets: the fiscal and the social security budgets.7 The fiscal 
budget’s main source of revenue is the income tax (personal and business).   Other major 
sources of revenue include IPI, a value added tax centered in the industrial sectors, import 
tax, IOF (a tax on loans, the purchase of foreign exchange, and insurance premiums) and 
CIDE (a recently created federal fuel contribution tied to road repair and construction). 
The social security budget8 is fed by five contributions: (1) contribution of 
employee and employers, a 30 percent rate on payroll (20 percent paid by employers and 
10 percent by employees); (2) COFINS, a turnover tax created in 1982 that was  
converted in 2004 to a VAT; (3) PIS, a contribution on turnover created in 1970 that was 
converted to a VAT in 2002; (4) CPMF, a contribution created in 1994 to finance health 
care (its rate of 0.38 percent to be applied to bank debit entries of current and savings 
accounts and other similar transactions); and (5) CSLL (contribution on net profits). 
This brief description reveals that Brazil has not one, but four VAT.  The states 
have one and the federal government has three. All considered, this mode of taxation 
raised 13.3 percent of GDP in 2004.  
The primary source of revenue for the states is the ICMS – a broad-based 
consumption-type VAT that produced revenue of 7.81 percent of GDP in 2004 and is the 
most important tax collected in the country. 
The states also raise revenues with two other levies: a tax on ownership of 
vehicles (IPVA) and an inheritance and donation tax (ITCD). The municipalities tax 
certain services (ISS) and urban property (IPTU).  
The FGTS contribution (workers’ retirement fund) is not an item of revenue of the 
federal treasury. Created in 1996 to reduce labor market rigidities, its proceeds are 
deposited in individuals’ accounts and can be withdrawn in the case of unmotivated 
dismissal, retirement, or death of the beneficiary.  
 
 
BOX 7.1.  Tax Bases and Tax Rates 
  
FEDERAL TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
  
   PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
      Annual Taxable Income 
         Under R$ 12,696  -  exempted
         From  R$ 12,696 to R$ 25,000   -  rate of 15.0%  (-)  R$ 1,904
         Above R$ 25,380  -  rate of 27.5%  (-)  R$ 5,076 
  
   BUSINESS INCOME TAX 
      Annual Taxable Income (profits)
      Basic rate: 15% 
      Additional rate ( annual profits above R$ 240,000): 10%
  
   IPI - Tax on industrialized products
A value added tax with differentiated rates in the industrial sector, wholesale and imports. 54% of 
the tax revenue is derived from the sales of liquor & beverages, automobiles, tobacco, and imports by 
industry. 
  
   SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
     (a levy based on payroll)   
Employees pay a 10% rate 
Employers pay a 20% rate 
  
  SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION ON PROFITS
The tax base is the same as the one used in the business income taxes. The rate is 9%.
  
  PIS AND COFINS 
Pis and Cofins are earmarked taxes and have the same tax base. For small firms the common base 
is gross revenue and the rates are, 0,65% and 3,0% respectively. For large firms the common base is 
value added (computed using the subtraction method) with rates of 1,65% and 7,6% respectively.  
  
  CPMF.  Taxes debit entries of current & saving accounts at a rate of 0,38%. 
  
  FGTS. The tax base is payroll and the tax rate is 8%.
  




   ICMS  
      Rates on value added, computed using the rax-credit method:
         Internal rates  (within the State) :  17% - 18% - 25%
         Interstate commerce :  7% - 12%
         Exports  :  Non–taxable (zero debit rate and creditation in full).
  
   IPVA. Taxes the market value of vehicles at a rate of 2% to 4% depending on the state. 
  




TAX ON SERVICES. A tax based on the value of a well defined (nationally) list of services with a 
flat tax rate of  2% and a maximum rate of 5%. 
  
URBAN PROPERTY TAX. Modal rates are: 0.25% on buildings and 2.0% on bare land.
 
 Sources: Elaborated by the authors from different sources. 
           
 
The Evolution of the Tax Burden (Central Government, States and Municipalities) 
 
In 1947, when the first national account statistics were published in Brazil, the overall tax 
burden corresponded to 13.8 percent of GDP. In the late 1960s, the ratio was pushed to 
25 percent, as a result of a comprehensive tax reform. The 25 percent ratio, with some 
fluctuations, prevailed through the 1970s and even until 1989, as shown in Graph 7.1. In 
the troubled years of 1990 to 1993, however, the ratio reached a record level of 29.6 
percent in the presence of very high rates of inflation and a stagnant economy. The ratio 
was subsequently restored to its historical level of 25 percent in the following years. 
A new benchmark was established in 1994 when the tax burden corresponded to 
27.9 percent of GDP. In that year, inflation was brought down to manageable levels as a 








Graph 7.1. Total Tax Revenue 


















    Source: IBGE. Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
What is remarkable is that in the period from 1993 to 2004, the ratio increased 
eight percentage points, moving from a 25 percent ratio in 1993 to its present level of 33 
percent. 
At this juncture, it is natural to ask why such an effort was made and how it was 
made. The short answer to the first question is that additional revenue was needed to 
sustain social expenditures (primarily pensions and health care), as determined by the 
new constitution, and to bring public deficit under control. The mechanisms used were 





Direct and Indirect Taxes 
 
Table 7.A.1, which can be found in the Appendix to this chapter, shows the several levies 
collected under the usual titles of direct and indirect taxes; Graph 7.2 exhibits some of the 
results. 
 




















Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes  
 Source: IBGE and Varsano and Others (1998), elaborated by the authors. 
      
It can be seen that for most of the 1980s, an almost fifty-fifty partition prevailed 
between direct and indirect taxes.9 In the 1990s, indirect modes of taxation dominated, 
due to the creation and rate increases of social contributions (FINSOCIAL, PIS, and 






To shed further light on the evolution of the tax system in Brazil, we can break down the 
tax burden into five categories, as presented in Table 7.A.3 of the Appendix. We classify 
taxes into the categories of taxes on foreign trade, goods and services, property, income, 
and payroll. As shown in Graph 7.3, taxes on goods and services dominate the picture. 
Contributions based on payroll occupied a distant second place during all the period, 
though income taxes approach them recently. 
 





















Foreign Trade Taxes on Goods and Services Property Taxes Income Taxes Taxes on Payroll
 
          Source: IBGE and Varsano and Others (1998), elaborated by the authors. 
As shown above, property and import taxes have not been important in the 
formation of total revenue of the public sector in Brazil. More specifically, import taxes, 
which raised 50 percent of the federal government’s revenue in the 1920s have lost 
ground since the 1940s and continue to decline. 
From 1980 to 2004, the total tax burden in proportion to GNP grew eight 
percentage points. Of this increase, almost five percentage points were the result of 
increases in taxes on goods and services – mostly contributions to finance social security. 
The remaining increase of three percentage points was due to an increase in income 
taxation. 
The data reveal how social security expenditures have increased in the last fifteen 
years. In 1989, the revenues that sustained the fiscal and social budgets as a percent of 
GDP were 7.4 percent and 5.2 percent respectively. In 2004, the proportions changed 
significantly – 12.7 percent of GDP was allocated to social security versus 8.0 percent to 
the fiscal budget. 
Contributions on payroll listed on Table 7.A.3 do not represent the only economic 
impact resulting from governmental intervention in labor markets in Brazil. Other legal 
provisions, associated with the hiring (and firing) of workers, are also relevant for 
economic analysis. In fact, payroll taxes represent only 35 percent of the total burden 
imposed by legal obligation on hiring workers. The wedge that exists between take-home 
pay and the wage paid by employers is around 100 percent. It seems that Brazil is, by far, 
the country that imposes the heaviest load on hiring workers in the world (Table 7.2). 
Most analysts agree that this fact has contributed to an increase in informal labor relations 
and unemployment. 
 
Table 7.2. Hiring Costs: Social Security and Other Costs (Selected Countries) 














Asian Tigers (average) 11.50 
USA 9.03 





Table 7.3, based on the work of Tanzi & Zee (2000), indicates that Brazil has a tax 
revenue to GDP ratio equivalent to that of a developed country and a tax structure that 
combines elements found in the tax structures of both developing and developed 
countries. 
One can conclude from Table 7.3 that Brazil has the biggest tax burden among 
developing countries (the block “other countries” in the lower right hand side in the 
table). The data seem to indicate that tax revenue in OECD countries rests on three pillars 
of almost equal size: income (14.2 percent), consumption (11.4 percent), and social 
security (9.5 percent). The proportion of income to consumption taxes in OECD countries 
is close to 1.2 while in Brazil, the ratio is about 0.6. With respect to social security taxes, Brazil exhibits a GDP ratio very 
similar to the ratio of OECD countries and well above other developing countries. 
Table 7.3. Composition of Tax Revenue by Regions, 1985-1997 
(As a percentage of GDP) 
 
 
1985 - 1987 1995-1997 
Income Taxes on Consumption Income Taxes on Consumption 
 Of  which:  Of  which:  Of  which:  Of  which: 
 










OECD     
  Countries1 
13.9 2.8 11.3 11.3 6.0 3.8 0.7 8.8 14.2 3.1 10.8 11.4 6.6 3.6 0.3 9.5 
America 14.0 2.5 11.4 7.6 3.4 2.2 0.6 5.8 15.4 3.0 12.3 7.0 3.7 2.0 0.3 6.1 
Pacific 17.1 3.9 13.2 7.5 2.3 3.7 0.8 2.8 16.3 4.3 11.4 8.4 4.3 2.6 0.6 3.5 
Europe 13.3 2.7 11.0 12.4 6.8 4.0 0.7 10.1 13.7 2.9 10.6 12.4 7.3 4.0 0.3 10.8 
Other  
  Countries2 
4.9 2.8 1.7 10.3 2.3 2.6 4.2 1.2 5.2 2.6 2.2 10.5 3.6 2.4 3.5 1.3 
 
Africa 6.3 2.9 3.1 11.7 3.2 2.3 5.7 0.4 6.9 2.4 3.9 11.6 3.8 2.3 5.1 0.5 
Asia 5.7 3.6 2.1 9.5 1.9 2,5 3.6 0.1 6.2 3.0 3.0 9.7 3.1 2.2 2.7 0.3 
Middle 
East 
4.7 4.3 1.0 9.1 1.5 2,4 4.4 1.2 5.0 3.2 1.3 10.3 1.5 3.0 4.3 1.1 
Western  
  Countries 
3.7 1.8 10 106 2.6 3.0 3.7 2.4 3.7 2.3 1.0 10.6 4.8 2.3 2.6 2.5 
 
Brazil 5.2 2.0 3.2 8.83 7.4 0.9 0.5 8.3 5.2 2.2 3.0 9.4 8.1 0.7 0.6 9.2 




Fiscal Extraction - % of GDP 
 1985-1987 1995-1997 1985-1987 1995-1997  1985-1987 1995 – 1997
 
OECD  
  Countries1 
1.2 1.2 0.2 0.3 OECD 
  Countries1 
36.6 37.9 
America 1.8 2.2 0.2 0.2 America 30.6 32.6 
Pacific 2.3 1.9 0.3 0.4 Pacific 30.7 31.6 
Europe 1.1 1.1 0.2 0.3 Europe 38.2 39.4 
Other 
Countries2 
0.5 0.5 1.6 1.2 Other  
  Countries2 
17.5 18.2 
 
Africa 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.6 Africa 19.6 19.8 
Asia 0.6 0.6 1.6 1 Asia 16.1 17.4 
Middle East 0.5 0.5 4.3 2.5 Middle East 16.5 18.1 
Western    
  Countries 
0.4 0.4 1.8 2.3 Western  
  Countries 
17.6 18 
 
Brazil 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 Brazil 23.45 29.03 
  Source: Tanzi, V and Zee H. H. Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing 
Countries. IMF Working Paper, March 2000. 
  1Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Poland. 
  2A sample of 8 African Countries, 9 Asian Countries, 7 of Middle East and 14 Western 
Countries.  





To understand how revenue sharing is carried out in Brazil, one must consider Brazil’s 
institutional organization. Brazil is composed of twenty-six states, one federal district and 
nearly 5,600 municipalities. Together, these entities collect 35 percent of total revenue 
and incur a similar percentage of public sector expenditures. The regional governments 
have an equal legal footing with the central government, and they form a decentralized 
federation.10 From the early days of the republic (1889) and more intensively since the 
1930s, there have been increased calls for the decentralization of expenditure capacity 
through mandated revenue-sharing mechanisms. 
The Constitution determines that 21.5 percent of the revenue of IPI and income 
tax (personal and business) must be distributed in favor of the states and 22.5 percent of 
the same sources in favor of local governments. Another proviso says that an additional 3 
percent of those taxes must be reserved for regional development programs. This implies 
that almost half (47 percent) of the total revenue of IPI and income tax are allocated to 
regional governments. Constitutional rules also mandate that 25 percent of ICMS 
revenue, the states’ VAT and 50 percent of IPVA (vehicles tax) be given to their 
respective local governments. 
Table 7.4 indicates that mandated revenue-sharing has increased the share of 
states and local governments of total disposable tax revenue since 1980, while the federal 
government has had its share reduced to 58.9 percent. In terms of revenue raised, the 
federal government has been losing ground – 75.1 percent in 1980 compared with 67.9 
percent in 2004. 
 




% of GDP % of Total 
 
Federal States Local Total Federal States Local Total 
Revenue Raised 
1980 18.50 5.40 0.70 24.60 75.1 22.0 2.9 100.0
1988 15.81 5.94 0.65 22.40 70.6 26.5 2.9 100.0
2004 24.96 9.81 1.99 36.76 67.9 26.7 5.4 100.0
Disposable Revenue (after transfers) 
1980 17.00 5.50 2.10 24.60 69.2 22.2 8.6 100.0
1988 14.00 6.00 2.40 22.40 62.3 26.9 10.8 100.0
2004 21.56 9.03 6.05 36.64 58.9 24.6 16.5 100.0
     Source : Khair et al. (2005). 
Earmarking and other Budgetary Constraints 
 
Brazil uses revenue earmarking extensively, particularly at the federal level. It has been 
estimated that about 80 percent of federal tax revenues were earmarked in 2003 against 
less than 60 percent in 1988.11 This includes mandated revenue sharing in favor of states 
and municipalities, as well as special-purpose funds. Revenue sharing accounts for about 
15 percent of federal tax revenues and is concentrated on the income tax and IPI, which 
are the federal government’s most income-elastic taxes. 
Efforts to increase federal revenue net of mandated transfers to the regional 
governments have resulted in greater reliance on contributions whose revenues are 
earmarked to social security but not shared with regional governments. 
 To mitigate this problem, a provisional arrangement to withhold federal 
earmarked revenues has been in place since 2000. A constitutional amendment now 
permits that 20 percent of all federal revenues (net of intergovernmental transfers), be 
withheld by the federal government, thereby reducing the extent of de facto revenue 
earmarking at the federal level.  
In addition, there are significant expenditure rigidities at the federal and regional 
government levels. All levels of government are required by the Constitution to earmark 
a share of revenue (18 percent for the federal government and 25 percent for state and 
municipal governments) to finance education. Moreover, the states and municipalities are 
required to earmark 12 percent and 15 percent of their revenues, respectively, to finance 
health care. 
 
Key Changes in the Tax Laws 
 
Opening Up to International Trade 
 
Brazil has a long history of utilizing tariff and non-tariff barriers to promote its 
industrialization and growth. This policy can be considered successful, given the creation 
of a broad and diversified industrial sector in the second half of the twentieth century and 
the growth rates of GDP observed for more than fifty years up to 1980. 
Despite these results, based on short and long run considerations, in the late 
1970s, the social costs of protection appeared excessive to analysts and government 
officials. Consequently, legal (nominal) and effective tariff rates have been substantially 
reduced since 1988. Average nominal tariff rates were brought down from 55 percent in 
1987 to 13.4 percent in 1998. The same path was followed by the effective rate, which 
were reduced from 67.8 percent in 1987 to its present level of 15 percent as shown in 
Graph 7.4. 
The process of eliminating trade barriers may be considered successful. The levels 
of imports and exports observed in 1987 (US $15 and US $26.2 billion respectively) 
increased fourfold  by 2004 (US $62.7 billion and US $96.4 billion), and there are strong 
indications that imports of capital goods contributed to the modernization and 
productivity gains in the economy as a whole. 
 
Graph 7.4. Nominal and Effective Tax Rates1 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            












1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Nominal rates Effective rates     
 
Source: Kume et al. (2003). 
  1Weighted by value added. 
 
Transformation of Turnover Taxes in Value Added Taxes 
 
Taxation of Small Businesses (SIMPLES) 
 
In 1996, the federal government enacted a law to meet the recurring demands of small 
businesses for lower taxes, simplification, and reduced compliance costs.12 
For this segment, tax rates on sales vary from 3 percent to 7 percent, 
progressively, and this payment substitutes for the payment of six federal taxes and 
contributions: the business income tax, social contribution on profits, PIS, COFINS, IPI, 
and the employer contribution to social security. 
 
Taxation of Capital Goods under ICMS 
 
Until 1996, capital goods were taxed under ICMS without the benefit of a tax 
credit. ICMS was then a gross-income VAT.  With new national legislation (LC 
87/1996), however, a tax credit is permitted in forty-eight monthly installments thus 
correcting, at least partially, an important distortion of the tax. 
 
Taxation of Exports 
 
The legislators tax on Industrialized Products and ICMS (the State VAT) 
distinguish two types of non-taxed products: the exempted/zero rated and the immune. 
The former is a tax status that can be changed by ordinary legislation (laws and decrees) 
while the latter is a constitutional provision. 
Typically, to an exempted/zero rated transaction made in the domestic market, 
both in the case of IPI and ICMS, corresponds a situation in which no tax credit can be 
taken by the seller. In other words, since the tax is not due, no tax credit is taken by the 
exempted seller. Of course this proviso has negative consequences when the zero rates 
occur in the intermediate stages of the productive process, in the form of cascading 
effects in the later stages. 
Since 1988, industrial exports were exempted from taxation while exports of 
primary/semi-processed goods could be and, were, in many cases, taxed. An awkward 
situation persisted, however: industrial exporters had a zero tax rate for their sales abroad 
but did not have the benefit of a full tax credit for the tax paid on the acquisition of raw 
materials and other inputs.  
 Again, LC 87/1996 corrected the problem by granting tax immunity to all exports 
and the benefit of full tax credit. This was an important reform since it reduced the supply 
price of capital goods and at the same time enhanced the competitive position of 
Brazilian exports in general. 
 
Transformation of Federal Turnover Taxes in Value Added Taxes 
 
Beginning in January 2002, the federal contribution known as PIS was tentatively 
converted in a VAT. As a turnover tax, it had a 0.36 percent rate and was replaced by a 
1.65 percent VAT rate. Subsequently, in 2004, the federal government transformed 
COFINS, also a turnover tax, in a sort of VAT with a 7.6 percent rate. 
 
PIS and COFINS are earmarked taxes (to social security) and have the same tax base. For 
small firms the common base is gross revenue and the rates are, 0,65% and 3,0% 
respectively. For large firms the common base is value added (computed using the 
subtraction method) with rates of 1,65% and 7,6% respectively. 
 
The conversion of PIS and COFINS in VAT cannot be seen as a definite improvement in 
the direction of eliminating cascading effects. Indeed, the option of taxing value added is 
only open to large firms (mainly exporters). These firms pay the tax computing value 
added using the subtraction method (sales –value of inputs and materials used). Small 
and middle size firms collect the tax based on their monthly turnover. On both counts, it 
can be said that, the cumulative or cascading effects are still present. 
 
The Creation of CPMF in 1994 
 
CPMF (Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions), a tax earmarked for health 
expenditures, is a tax on certain financial transactions levied on withdrawals from and 
other debits to bank accounts.  
According to Coelho (2001), a bank-debit tax was first introduced in Argentina in 
1983 and was later implemented in Peru (1989), Brazil (1994), Venezuela (1994), 
Colombia (1998), Australia (1998), and Ecuador (1999). In all cases, the tax was 
introduced on a temporary basis, though in the case of Brazil, successive extensions have 
given it a permanent status. At present, only Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador continue to 
enforce the tax while the other countries have abandoned the experiment. 
Overall, CPMF was considered by Coelho (2001) the most successful example of 
this mode of taxation in Latin America and has been generating revenue of 1.5 percent of 
GDP, a level that has been sustained for several years (see Table 7.A.2). 
Coelho (2001) points out that there is evidence that CPMF altered financial and 
investment behavior, especially in the wake of its reintroduction at the end of January 
1997. In summarizing their analysis, the authors recommended that such taxes should be 
avoided; if they are to be used, they should only be levied at low rates and the base 
should be defined so as to exclude, among other things, transactions in securities markets. 
 
Taxation of Mineral Resources 
 
Brazil is a rich country in natural resources and a big exporter of iron ore, aluminum, 
nickel, stones and a self-sufficient producer of petroleum.  
The industry has been preserved from the federal tax on industrialized products (IPI) but 
is taxed by the states’ VAT (ICMS). In addition it pays a financial compensation 
(royalties) to the federal government and to the state and municipality where the 
extraction process takes place. 
By far, oil production financial compensations are more significant compared to other 
minerals. On this account, in 2004, oil producers paid R$ 11.1 billion (0,63% of GDP) to 
the federal government, states and municipalities13. In the same year the financial 
compensations paid by non-oil mineral producers amounted to R$ 326.0 million. 
 
Current Problems of Design and Administration of the Tax System. 
 
The construction of a better tax system in Brazil will demand a profound revision of 
certain expenditure patterns that have developed during the last fifteen years. Ultimately, 
it was this upward surge in public expenditures that created the demand for new 
resources. 
Most analysts consider a 33 percent tax burden oppressive and some even 
consider it abusive. Regardless of which description is more accurate, the percentage 
attained in 2004 is high for a developing country, according to international standards. 
What makes matters worse is that this increase in the tax burden has been followed by a 
deterioration of public services at the federal and regional levels. 
The underlying cause for the deterioration of public services can be traced to the 
increase in current expenditures since the early 1990s. Such increases are due to social 
security concessions and interest payments on public debt which have increased twofold 
since 1994 (interest payments in 2004 represented 6.4 percent of GDP). In other words, 
the necessary fiscal adjustment has been accomplished primarily through tax increases 
and by compressing public investment. The greatest challenge now is to reconcile the 
need for continued fiscal consolidation with that of alleviating a high tax burden. 
In the short run, progress can be made if interest rates could be reduced at a pace 
more rapid than that intended by the monetary authorities. In the long run, progress will 
demand more reforms of Brazil’s public pension system. Currently, the public pension 
system costs 9 percent of GDP (above the OECD average) and is unjust, expensive, and 





The most common criticisms of the Brazilian tax system are that there are too many types 
of taxes and that the tax laws and regulations in effect are overly complex and difficult to 
control and comply with. Both criticisms are accurate. 
 
Regressive Distribution of Tax Burden 
 
A study by Vianna et al. (2000) reported incidence estimates for the Brazilian tax system. 
The results indicated that the tax system is highly regressive. Despite the fact that direct 
taxes are progressive, the final result is dominated by highly regressive indirect taxes.  
 
Earmarking   
 
There is a great amount of earmarking embedded in the different taxes and contributions. 
In the case of the federal government, as noted earlier, earmarking is an especially serious 
problem. The obvious consequences of phenomenon are the loss of budget flexibility, as 
well as the inefficient use of public money. 
 
Tax on Payroll  
 
Regulation of the labor market and taxation of payroll more than double the private cost 
of hiring labor. This fact seems to explain a significant part of the informal economy, 
which is a manifestation of disguised unemployment (Box 7.2).  
 
The Move to Reform ICMS  
 
After an unsuccessful attempt to create a single VAT that would consolidate most of the 
indirect taxes in Brazil, the call for simplification of the tax system was directed toward 
the creation of a single VAT legislation for all states. At present, Congress has set the 
basic rules of the VAT and the states have a high degree of autonomy in setting internal 
rates. Congress also has been discussing new legislation with far reaching implications, 
the most important being a provision that subtracts from the states the prerogative to 
legislate and regulate the tax.  
 
BOX 7.2 - The Informal Economy in Brazil 
 
 
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) conducted two surveys 
of the urban informal sector, known as ECINF 1997 and ECINF 2003. Based on the 2003 
survey, IBGE reported that the informal sector in urban areas was comprised of 10.5 
million small businesses, half of which had no legal registration. 
According to the 2003 survey, the annual revenue of those firms was R$ 217.5 
billion, which corresponded to 14% of GDP. The investments they made were R$ 7.2 
billion, equivalent to 2.3% of total investment registered in the national accounts. The 
most common economic activities in the informal economy were retail trade and repair 
(33%), construction (17%), and manufacturing and extraction (16%).  The survey also 
registered that 31% of the owners of informal firms declared that they opened the 
business because they could not find any job and 17.6% because they needed to improve 
their family’s income.   
IBGE has estimated that between 1997 and 2003, employment in the formal 
sector increased 4% while the urban informal sector increased by 8% (from 12.9 to 13.9 
million workers).  This last figure corresponded to 26% of the labor force and, of the total 
employed, only 6% had social security registration. 
Concern with the informal sector in Brazil is important because of job 
precariousness and its social consequences (e.g., lack of unemployment compensations, 
retirement income, access to financial services, etc).  A substantial share of Brazil’s 
workers is without legal registration (60%) and approximately the same percentage 
(62%) of private sector workers have not been contributing to social security. 
The figure below contains data collected by Cardoso Jr & Fernandes (2000) in 
which occupied workers are classified according to legal status in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The formal segment of the labor market is comprised of workers with legal 
registration in the private sector and public employees (civil and military).  The second 
group is comprised of those workers without legal registration, the self employed, and 
workers without pay. 
The data indicate the dominance of informal labor relations in both periods.  In 
addition, the data show an increase in informality in the 1990s, which seems to be 
independent of GDP cyclical behavior in contraposition to the (cyclical) behavior 
observed in the 1980s.   
Barrros (1993) and Amadeo & Camargo (1996) provide empirical results 
supporting the hypothesis that labor market regulations and payroll taxes are the main 




Graph 7.5. Occupied Workers According to Legal Status, 1981-1998 
 
 
      Source: Cardoso Jr. & Fernandes (2000). 
 
Tax Administration: Methods and Experiences 
 
In the last decade or so, Brazil has made significant progress in tax administration, both 
in terms of reducing tax evasion and, more importantly, by abandoning the traditional 
mentality of taxpayers as tax evaders in favor one that considers taxpayers as clients. 




Most of Brazilian taxes and contribution are self-assessed, with the exception of property 
taxes and CPMF (tax on financial transactions). For this reason, tax administrators in 
Brazil try to monitor physical transactions among taxpayers by tracking invoices and 
accounting books. Such activities are increasingly accomplished through the use of 
information technology. 
 
Internet Tax Filings 
 
According to Bill Gates,14 several countries, including the United States and Australia, 
allow people to file taxes electronically. Brazil, however, was the first country to enable 
large-scale tax filings electronically. This solution was implemented on March 30, 1997, 
and was made available to the public during the month of April, the last month required 
for an individual’s income tax filing (business filings are due at the end of May). In 2002, 





Another important development in tax administration was the creation of SISCOMEX in 
1993. The system integrates the activities of registration, follow-up, and control of 
foreign trade in such a way that all federal agencies that play a role (including taxation) in 
the control of imports and exports operate exclusively using the data source provided by 
SISCOMEX. The benefits of such a system are represented by a paperless environment, 





In the area of control, the creation of SINTEGRA in 2000 deserves attention.  SINTEGRA 
is a system that allows for the electronic exchange of information of the states’ VAT 
(ICMS), linking databases of the states as a mean to control interstate trade and to 
standardize procedures. The system also contains a portal where taxpayers can check data 
on suppliers, assuring that they are active taxpayers in the cadastres of each state. This is 
important because the amount of ICMS due is the result of a debit/credit calculation on 
multiple stages of the economic chain.  SINTEGRA is based on the experience of the 
European VIES–VAT information exchange system (see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/databases/viesen.htm), and it has resulted in 
gains of scale due to the shared collection, treatment and storage of information. 
Appendix 
The Macroeconomic Setting: 1980-2004 
 
The story of the Brazilian economy during the last twenty-five years can be deduced from 
the GDP growth rates, as exhibited in Graph 7.A.1. The fluctuation of these rates 
resembles that of a faulty engine. After fifty years of steady growth, averaging 6.5 
percent per year, GDP growth has almost ground to a halt, averaging only 2.4 percent a 
year from 1980 to 2004. 
 



















































           Source: IBGE. Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
Brazil entered 1980 facing a macroeconomic situation that combined high 
inflation rates, high external debt, and a critical situation in its external accounts. In 1980 
the inflow of external resources (US $9.6 billion) was insufficient to cover the current 
account deficit of US $12.7 billion. This figure was the result of the trade balance deficit 
(US $2.8 billion) and, more importantly, of resources sent abroad to service of external 
debts.15 In 1980, the country’s gross external debt was US $64.3 billion (27 percent of 
GDP) and the annual inflation rate was 110.2 percent.  
From 1981 to 1983, Brazil faced a period of contraction in its economy, with GDP 
growth dropping to an average rate of 2.16 percent per year. This situation was the result 
of a restrictive monetary policy (high real interest rates) aimed at two objectives: redirect 
internal production to exports by reducing of internal demand and to attract foreign 
capital to overcome the balance of payments (BP) imbalance. The initial results of this 
policy came in the form of small trade surpluses in 1982 and 1983, however, these 
surpluses were not sufficient to cover the balance of payments deficit. In 1982, after a 
significant loss of international reserves, Brazil signed an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund and raised US $4.2 billion in loans.16 In 1983, the 
government promoted another 30 percent devaluation of the exchange rate and obtained 
good results. The restrictive monetary policy, assisted by the maturation of investments 
carried through the II National Development Plan,17 resulted in an increase of the trade 
balance and a BP surplus in 1984. Also, in 1984, a promising recovery of economic 
activity was observed with a real growth in GDP of 5.4 percent. 
 
 
Graph 7.A.2. Trade Balance, 1980-2004 
    
            
            
            
            
            
            
            

























       Source: BCB. Elaborated by the authors. 
 


















Balance of Payments Current AccountFinancial Account
 
  Source: BCB, elaborated by the authors. 
 
The adjustment of external accounts was painful and the ratio of external debt to 
GDP increased in the early 1980s and reached its highest level in 1984, representing 54 
percent of GDP (Graph 7.A.6). Brazil was confronted with the fact that the external debt 
was predominantly public, but the commercial surplus was private.18 This worsened the 
internal fiscal problem, resulting in a higher public deficit, since the government was 
unable to obtain sufficient tax revenue to pay the costs of this indebtedness. However, it 
is worth noting that the public external debt was not only the result of budget deficits 
accumulated over the years, but also the outcome of a process carried out by the 
government which converted a significant share of  the external private debt into internal 
public debt.19 
During the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, the external debt played an important 
role in the formation of the net public debt.20  With the renegotiation of external debt and 
the implementation of the Real Plan, internal debt took the dominant position (Graph 
7.A.4). This development was related to monetary policy. High interest rates attracted 
foreign capital that was converted into domestic currency, expanding the monetary base. 
At the same time the government, concerned with inflation, issued public bonds to 




























































Internal Debt External Debt
 
  Source: BCB. Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
The price level throughout the 1981-1984 period increased at an accelerated pace. 
In 1981, annual inflation was 95.2 percent, followed by 99.7 percent in 1982, 221 percent 
in 1983, and 223.8 percent in 1984 (Graph 7.A.5). 
In 1985, democratic elections were restored after two decades of military 
dictatorship. At that time inflation – its causes and cures – was at the center of the 
national economic debate.21 
In 1985, the inflation rate was 235.1 percent and the trade balance registered a 
surplus (US $12.5 billion). However, this result, though aided by the inflow of foreign 
capital, was unable to cover the current account deficit. Interest payments alone 
represented a diversion of resources of US $11.6 billion. Remarkably GDP grew 7.8 
percent in 1985. 
In 1986, the government implemented the first of five stabilization plans designed 
to bring inflation under control. The Cruzado (1986) along with other plans – Bresser 
(1987), Verão (1989), Collor I (1990), and Collor II (1991) – identified the generalized 
indexation of contracts – a process in which contracts are adjusted according to past 
inflation in an attempt to recover real income lost with the rise of the price level22 – as 
the main cause of inflation. The principal instrument adopted to solve the inflationa
problem was the use of price control mechanisms. In all cases, the results were very poor.  
ry 
Table 7.A.1 indicates the period that price control lasted in each stabilization plan, 
as well as its results. Looking at Graph 7.A.5, one can observe that price controls 
generally were not effective. The only exception was the Collor I plan which managed to 
reduce inflation from a rate of 81.3 percent in March 1990 to levels around 20 percent per 
month until the adoption of the Collor II plan (April 1991).  
 








Before During After 
Cruzado March 1986 November 1986 9 11.1 10.3 14.5 
Bresser June 1987 August 1987 3 15.4 21.6 16.5 
Verão  January 1989 May 1989 5 27.3 100.8 37.6 
Collor I March 1990 June 1990 4 72.8 71.1 18.3 
Collor II January 1991 April 1991 4 18.3 41.1 21.1 
  Mean 5 28.8 44.4 21.6 
 
  Source: Franco (2005).  
  Note: “Before” refers to the last month before the price control was introduced. 
“After” means the sixth month after the end of price controls. The mean for 
“during” considers the duration of the price control.  
 
Under the Cruzado and Bresser plans, the economy continued to grow;  7.5 
percent in 1986 and 3.5 percent in 1987. However, the use of restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policies reduced GDP growth to -0.1 percent in 1987. In 1989, with the Verão 
(summer) plan, the economy grew 3.2 percent, but in 1990, GDP contracted 4.3 percent. 
This was the result of a severe monetary base reduction promoted by the Collor I plan, 
which seized, for a period, all financial funds over 50,000 Cruzados Novos 
(approximately US $1,310).  
The crawling-peg exchange rate system that had been in effect since 1968 was 
also affected by the stabilization plans.23 The Cruzado Plan established a monetary 
reform which substituted the old currency Cruzeiro (Cr$) for the Cruzado (Cz$) at the 
rate of Cr$ 1,000.00 four Cz$ 1.00. The exchange rate was fixed at the value prevailing 
the day before the adoption of the plan and the crawling-peg system was abandoned. 
However, new inflationary pressures provoked the overvaluation of the domestic 
currency and led the government to reinstitute the crawling-peg mechanism. In 1987, the 
Bresser Plan devaluated the domestic currency by 9.5 percent and kept the crawling-peg 
mechanism. The Verão Plan, in 1989, also promoted a devaluation of the exchange rate 
of almost 18 percent and a monetary reform that replaced the Cruzado with a new 
currency called Cruzado Novo. The value of the Cruzado Novo was fixed against the 
dollar at the rate of one to one. In 1990, the Collor I plan adopted a floating exchange rate 
regime following the opening up of the Brazilian economy to external competition. 
However this was a “dirty” floating since the Central Bank frequently interfered to 
reduce exchange rate volatility.  
The Cruzado Plan was also characterized by a default on foreign debt. In 1986, a 
BP deficit of US $3.8 billion and the low level of foreign reserves (US $6.7 billion) 
forced the government to suspend payment on external debts as of January 1987.24 In 
January of the following year, this anomalous situation ceased but the thorny issue was 
only solved in 1992 with the Brady Plan.25 
The small GDP growth (1 percent) in 1991 was not even repeated in the next year. 
In 1992, Brazil suffered a political crisis which ended with the impeachment of President 
Fernando Collor. Although the balance of payments registered a surplus of US $14.7 
billion, high interest rates and the political crisis led to a fall of 0.5 percent in GDP. The 
country’s economy recovered only in 1993, when the GDP growth was 4.7 percent. 
Inflation accelerated again after the failure of the Collor I and II plans, reaching 480.2 
percent in 1991, 1157.8 percent in 1992, and 2708.2 percent in 1993. Of course, this state 
of affairs was unsustainable and, at last, the government implemented in 1994 an 







































































































































































































































































































  Source: FGV. Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
This time, inflation was brought down rapidly and remained low. In contrast with 
previous plans, price controls were not applied. Inertial inflation was eliminated through 
the complete indexation of the economy, followed by a monetary reform that created a 
new currency – the Real. At first, the stabilized prices were guaranteed by a combination 
of overvalued exchange rate and high interest rates. The former allowed the use of 
imported goods to prevent local producers from raising their prices and the latter attracted 
short-term resources to assure a balanced BP.26 
The results of those policies were immediately evident. Along with lower inflation 
rates, there was a reversal in the trade balance results (Graph 7.A.2). After successive 
surpluses from 1981 until 1994, the economy suffered consecutive deficits during the 
period when the exchange rates anchor was in effect. The deficit in current account was 
compensated by the inflow of foreign capital, mainly short-term resources. In 1995, from 
the resulting US $28.7 billion in the financial account, US $9.2 billion were portfolio 
investments and US $8.2 billion were short-term commercial credits. In 1996, the amount 
of foreign capital used to buy stocks and bonds increased: with a US $33.5 billion 
financial account surplus, US $21.6 billion were portfolio investment and only US $11.3 
billion were represented by direct investment. 
 
BOX 7.3 - Seignorage 
 
Given the very high rates of inflation observed in the 1980s and early 1990s, one should 
note the behavior of seignorage revenue1 during this period.  Following Rocha & 
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  Source: Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
As it should be expected, seignorage revenues were significant during the period 1988-
1994 when annual inflation rates were above 1000% (in 1993 it reached 2708%).  After 
the Real Plan (1994), when inflation was brought under control, seignorage as a percent 
of GDP was reduced significantly. 
1"The amount of real purchasing power that [a] government can extract from the public 
by printing money." (Cukierman, 1992) 


















 . Where: 
tH  = monetary base at the end of t,  t = rate of inflation between t-1 and t and Y t = 
nominal GDP in t. 
In the first three months of the Plano Real, the exchange rate followed a free 
floating system; however, negative results in the trade balance and the valuation of the 
exchange rate led the government to intervene. In March 1995, the government adopted a 
crawling band system, in which the Central Bank established a minimum and maximum 
value for the floatation of the exchange rate. For the brief period between March and June 
of 1995, these limiting values remained fixed. 
In the late nineties, the Asian financial crisis and the Russian default caused a 
drop in the inflow of foreign resources to Brazil. This led to a deficit in the balance of 
payments (Graph 7.A.3) and difficulties in financing the successive current account 
deficits that reached US $33.4 billion in 1998. Thus, in January of 1999, despite some 
desperate measures and a US $42 billion loan from the IMF, the Brazilian government 
was unable to defend the currency and a new devaluation took place. As a result, the 
government boldly reoriented its monetary policy through the adoption of inflation 
targeting and implemented a floating exchange rate regime.27 
GDP behavior since the Real Plan has been frustrating. Initially, price stability 
enabled growth, due to gains in real purchasing power of the poor. In 1994, GDP grew 
5.3 percent and in 1995, 4.4 percent. However, the government’s attempt to attract 
foreign capital through the adoption of high interest rates adversely affected GDP growth, 
which was 2.2 percent in 1996, 3.4 percent in 1997, and only 0.04 percent in 1998, a year 
in which the basic interest rate (Selic) reached 40 percent per year. Again, in 1999, high 
interest rates resulted in a GDP growth of only 0.3 percent. Despite the GDP growth of 
4.3 percent in 2000, the next two years exhibited low rates of growth – 1.3 percent in 
2001 and 2.7 percent in 2002 – due to conservative interest rate policies.  
 Two-thousand and two saw the election that brought a leftist party to the 
presidency. The fact that candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was leading in the polls 
caused instability in the financial markets, which provoked a new devaluation of the Real 
and entrance into a new agreement with the IMF. In 2002, the annual inflation rate 
reached 26.4 percent against 10.4 percent in 2001. To assure stability of the price level 
and to affirm to the financial markets a commitment to low inflation rates, the newly 
elected president tightened monetary and fiscal policies. The result was a small GDP 
growth of 1.1 percent in 2003 and an inflation rate of 7.7 percent.  
One very important development in the Brazilian economy after the adoption of a 
flexible exchange regime in 1999 has been the continuous improvement in the trade 
balance and in the balance of payments.  
In 2004, the excellent performance of the trade balance, due to a 32 percent 
growth in exports compared to 2003, surpassed the deficit in the financial account and 
guaranteed a BP surplus of US $2.2 billion. The expansion of the exporting sector 
















Graph 7.A.6. Gross External Debt, 1980-2004 











































               Source: BCB. Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
Since 1980, Brazil has endured great economic difficulty. As a result, the country 
continues to search for a new paradigm that will enable a new path of sustained economic 
growth. The result of this search has been a transition from a model that relied heavily on 
public investments and initiatives favoring import substitution to a more liberal approach 
with less government intervention.  
Economic liberalization began in 1990 with the Collor reduction of tariffs and 
non-tariffs barriers and the privatization of state-owned companies. The government of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso continued this trend toward liberalization by eliminating the 
state monopoly in telecommunications and oil and by privatizing utilities and public 
service state-owned companies.28 Most recently, it appears that the Lula administration has kept things on track. 
Still, there continues to be intense debate on the best means of using newly conquered price stability and a comfortable 
position in Brazil’s external accounts to achieve sustained economic growth. 
 
Table 7.A.2. Direct and Indirect Taxes, 1980-2004                                                                                          
(% do PIB) 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
Total Tax 
Revenue 24.51 25.26 26.32 26.96 24.35 24.06 26.18 23.77 22.43 24.13 28.78 25.25 25 25.78 29.77 29.39 28.92 28.58 29.33 31.07 30.36 31.87 32.35 31.90 32.77 
 
   Direct 
Taxes 11.47 12.33 13.55 13.45 12.93 12.99 13.96 12.37 11.08 12.22 13.6 11.4 12.05 12.65 14 14.24 14.24 15.80 16.44 17.06 15.60 16.42 17.26 17.14 17.32 
   Income 
tax 3.01 3.37 3.46 4.24 4.76 5.13 5.01 4.31 4.67 4.94 5.13 3.9 4.18 3.85 3.83 4.78 4.3 3.89 4.68 4.84 4.78 4.98 5.81 5.47 5.30 
   ITR 
(Federal 
rural  
     land 
tax) 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
   Social 
Security  
    
Contributi
on 
4.66 4.99 6.05 5.45 4.91 4.73 5.18 4.74 4.4 4.63 5.11 4.37 4.41 5.19 4.82 4.89 5.13 4.70 4.76 4.52 4.72 4.69 4.81 4.75 4.83 
   FGTS 
(Workers’  
     
retirement 
fund) 
2.32 2.49 2.52 2.4 2.01 1.92 2.46 1.94 0.86 1.41 1.46 1.29 1.28 1.25 1.78 1.51 1.5 1.38 1.71 1.63 1.59 1.62 1.52 1.47 1.30 
   
Contributi
on for  
0.22 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.2 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.32 0.08 0.26 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.19 
     
education 
   IPVA 
(Vehicles 
tax) 
- - - - - - 0.14 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.37 0.4 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 
   IPTU 
(Urban  
     
property) 
0.25 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.2 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.37 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.41 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.43 
   CPMF 
(Financial  
     
transactio
ns) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.07 1.06 - - 0.74 0.83 0.75 1.23 1.32 1.38 1.36 1.36 
   
Contributi
on on Net  
     Profits 
- - - - - - - - - 0.21 0.54 0.28 0.73 0.79 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.79 0.72 0.90 0.99 1.05 
   Others 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.91 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.9 0.72 0.7 0.77 0.94 0.84 1.08 0.88 0.99 1.2 3.07 2.54 3.52 1.36 1.93 1.69 1.96 2.38 
 
   Indirect 
Taxes 13.04 12.93 12.77 13.51 11.42 11.07 12.22 11.4 11.35 11.91 15.18 13.85 12.95 13.13 15.77 15.15 14.68 12.78 12.89 14.01 14.77 15.44 15.09 14.76 15.50 
   Import 
tax 0.7 0.59 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.4 0.48 0.4 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.4 0.45 0.52 0.76 0.54 0.55 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.54 0.48 0.47 
   IPI (Vat 
industry) 2.19 2.2 2.2 2.11 1.4 1.84 2.17 2.43 2.17 2.21 2.4 2.14 2.32 2.44 2.22 2.07 1.96 1.79 1.67 1.55 1.60 1.49 1.34 1.16 1.18 
   IOF 
(Loans 
tax) 0.94 1.16 1.14 0.72 0.86 0.55 0.67 0.57 0.35 0.16 1.3 0.59 0.62 0.8 0.69 0.5 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.46 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 
   Federal 
excise on  
     fuel 
2.12 2.16 1.87 2.11 0.29 0.16 0.14 0.31 0.31 0.04 0.02 0.02 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
   Federal 
excise on  
     energy 
0.21 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.02 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
   Federal 
excise on  
     
minerals 
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.01 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
   COFINS - - 0.27 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.71 0.67 0.77 1.1 1.54 1.55 1 1.37 2.56 2.43 2.3 2.04 1.91 3.02 3.38 3.56 3.54 3.50 4.08 
 
(VAT) 
   PIS 
(VAT) - - - - - - - - 0.4 0.64 1.14 1.05 1.08 1.16 1.07 0.91 0.95 0.81 0.77 0.92 0.85 0.88 0.87 1.02 1.03 
   Fed. 
contributi
ons on  
     
maritime 
freight  
0.14 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.17 - 0.10 0.14 - - - - - 0.06 - - - - - - - - 
   ICMS  
(VAT) 4.87 4.95 5.08 5.03 5.29 5.44 6.35 5.49 5.34 6.41 7.24 6.76 6.42 6.04 7.33 7.3 7.15 6.35 6.22 6.37 6.98 7.24 7.13 7.02 7.10 
   ISS 
(Services) 0.26 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.51 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.54 
   IVVC 
(Retail 
sale of  
     fuel) 
- - - - - - - - - 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 - - - - - - - - - 
   CIDE 
(Federal 
fuel  
     tax) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.49 0.44 0.39 
   Others  1.53 1.06 1.11 1.62 1.73 1.29 0.88 0.8 1.02 0.43 0.52 0.82 0.64 0.46 0.88 0.64 0.79 0.33 0.78 0.47 0.44 0.77 0.41 0.34 0.44 
Source: IBGE, elaborated by Varsano and Others (1998) from 1980-96 and by the authors from 1997-2004.
Table 7.A.3. Tax revenue by Category, 1980-2004                                                                                    
(% do GDP) 
 
 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  
Total Tax 




0.7 0.59 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.4 0.48 0.4 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.4 0.45 0.52 0.76 0.54 0.55 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.54 0.48 0.47 
   Import 
tax  
0.7 0.59 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.4 0.48 0.4 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.4 0.45 0.52 0.76 0.54 0.55 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.54 0.48 0.47 
Taxes on 
Goods  
   and 
Services 
10.67 11.12 11.04 11.27 9.04 9.19 10.67 10.03 9.9 10.95 14.13 12.61 11.91 12.29 15.43 13.75 13.29 12.64 12.26 13.54 14.84 15.30 15.52 15.30 15.96 
   ICMS 
(VAT) 
4.87 4.95 5.08 5.03 5.29 5.44 6.35 5.49 5.34 6.41 7.24 6.76 6.42 6.04 7.33 7.3 7.15 6.35 6.22 6.37 6.98 7.24 7.13 7.02 7.10 
   IPI (Vat 
industry) 
2.19 2.2 2.2 2.11 1.4 1.84 2.17 2.43 2.17 2.21 2.4 2.14 2.32 2.44 2.22 2.07 1.96 1.79 1.67 1.55 1.60 1.49 1.34 1.16 1.18 
   IOF 
(Loans tax) 
0.94 1.16 1.14 0.72 0.86 0.55 0.67 0.57 0.35 0.16 1.3 0.59 0.62 0.8 0.69 0.5 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.46 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 
   COFINS 
(VAT) 
- - 0.27 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.71 0.67 0.77 1.1 1.54 1.55 1 1.37 2.56 2.43 2.3 2.04 1.91 3.02 3.38 3.56 3.54 3.50 4.08 
   PIS 
(VAT) 
- - - - - - - - 0.4 0.64 1.14 1.05 1.08 1.16 1.07 0.91 0.95 0.81 0.77 0.92 0.85 0.88 0.87 1.02 1.03 
   CPMF 
(Financial  
      
transaction
s) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.07 1.06 - - 0.74 0.83 0.75 1.23 1.32 1.38 1.36 1.36 
   ISS 
(Services) 
0.26 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.51 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.54 
   IVVC 
(Retail sale  
     of fuel) 
- - - - - - - - - 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 - - - - - - - - - 
   Federal 2.41 2.49 2.21 2.44 0.63 0.46 0.45 0.56 0.54 0.07 0.02 0.02 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Excises1 
   CIDE 
(Fuel Tax) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.49 0.44 0.39 
Property 
Taxes 
0.27 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.27 0.54 0.35 0.27 0.39 0.8 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.91 
   IPTU 
(Urban  
     
property) 
0.25 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.2 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.37 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.41 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.43 
   IPVA 
(Vehicles  
     tax) 
- - - - - - 0.14 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.37 0.4 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 
   ITR 
(Rural 
Land  
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Income 
Taxes 
3.01 3.37 3.46 4.24 4.76 5.13 5.01 4.31 4.67 5.15 5.67 4.18 4.91 4.64 4.8 5.69 5.15 4.71 5.47 5.52 5.57 5.70 6.71 6.46 6.36 
   Personal 
and  
    Business  
3.01 3.37 3.46 4.24 4.76 5.13 5.01 4.31 4.67 4.94 5.13 3.9 4.18 3.85 3.83 4.78 4.3 3.89 4.68 4.84 4.78 4.98 5.81 5.47 5.30 
   
Contributio
n on  
     Net 
Profits  
- - - - - - - - - 0.21 0.54 0.28 0.73 0.79 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.79 0.72 0.90 0.99 1.05 
Taxes on 
Payroll 
7.44 7.98 9.09 8.36 7.37 7.18 8.16 7.21 5.77 6.56 7.25 6.07 6.28 6.93 7.27 7.1 7.62 6.70 7.01 6.72 6.85 6.86 6.90 6.72 6.73 
   Social 
Security  
     
Contributio
n 
4.66 4.99 6.05 5.45 4.91 4.73 5.18 4.74 4.4 4.63 5.11 4.37 4.41 5.19 4.82 4.89 5.13 4.70 4.76 4.52 4.72 4.69 4.81 4.75 4.83 
   FGTS 
(workers  
     
retirement 
fund) 
2.32 2.49 2.52 2.4 2.01 1.92 2.46 1.94 0.86 1.41 1.46 1.29 1.28 1.25 1.78 1.51 1.5 1.38 1.71 1.63 1.59 1.62 1.52 1.47 1.30 
   
Contributio
0.22 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.2 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.32 0.08 0.26 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.19 
n for  
     
education 
   Public 
servants  
0.24 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.4 0.34 0.61 0.3 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.41 
Others 2.43 1.87 1.89 2.39 2.55 1.98 1.52 1.59 1.46 0.93 1.02 1.43 1.14 1.18 1.31 1.22 1.38 3.4 3.3 4.0 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.8 
   Others 
direct 
0.76 0.65 0.65 0.6 0.59 0.51 0.45 0.62 0.44 0.4 0.36 0.61 0.5 0.72 0.43 0.58 0.53 3.1 2.5 3.5 1.4 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.4 
   Others 
indirect 
1.67 1.22 1.24 1.79 1.96 1.47 1.07 0.97 1.02 0.53 0.66 0.82 0.64 0.46 0.88 0.64 0.85 0.33 0.78 0.47 0.44 0.77 0.41 0.34 0.44 
Source: IBGE and Varsano and Others (1998), elaborated by the authors. 
Table 7.A.4. Tax Burden, 1980-2004 









1980 24.45 1993 25.30 
1981 25.18 1994 27.90 
1982 26.24 1995 28.44 
1983 26.84 1996 28.63 
1984 24.19 1997 28.58 
1985 23.83 1998 29.33 
1986 26.50 1999 31.07 
1987 24.25 2000 30.36 
1988 23.36 2001 31.87 
1989 23.74 2002 32.35 
1990 29.60 2003 31.90 
1991 24.43 2004 32.77 
1992 24.96   
Source: IBGE. Data available at IpeaData, elaborated by the authors. 
 
 
Table 7.A.5. Gross Domestic Product in Brazil, 1980-2004 
Year Real billion US$ billion  
1980 4.55E-09 237.3 
1981 8.73E-09 257.9 
1982 1.77E-08 271.2 
1983 3.98E-08 189.6 
1984 1.27E-07 188.2 
1985 4.76E-07 210.9 
1986 1.27E-06 256.5 
1987 4.04E-06 283.0 
1988 2.94E-05 307.9 
1989 4.26E-04 413.0 
1990 1.15E-02 465.0 
1991 6.03E-02 407.7 
1992 6.41E-01 390.6 
1993 14.1 438.3 
1994 349.2 546.2 
1995 705.6 769.0 
1996 844.0 839.7 
1997 939.1 871.2 
1998 979.3 843.8 
1999 1065.0 586.9 
2000 1179.5 644.5 
2001 1302.1 554.0 
2002 1477.8 505.9 
2003 1699.9 552.2 
2004 1941.5 663.6 






1 The authors would like to thank Professor Roger Gordon and an anonymous reviewer 
for very useful comments. We are thankful also to Bernardo Dietze for compiling the tax 
revenue data used in the paper. Also we owe a special thanks to Luciana Lima for her 
assistance. 
2 Detailed information regarding the 1965-67 tax reform can be found in Giambiagi and 
Além (2000) p. 242-246. 
3 Formally, income taxation was introduced in Brazil in 1923. 
4 In the Brazilian tax system, contributions are a type of federal tax; the revenue raised 
from these has a specific destination, i.e. toward a particular public spending project.  
5 The Brazilian Constitution authorizes governments to impose three types of levies: 
taxes, contributions (social and others), and user charges. The legal distinction between a 
contribution and a tax is that the former is raised to finance a specific governmental 
activity (mostly social security), while the proceeds of taxes are used for general 
purposes. In other words, contributions are simply earmarked taxes.  
 
6 The 1967 law that established the new tax system was modified over the subsequent 
years so that by 1988 the tax structure had changed. 
7 Public budgets in Brazil are submitted to the legislature annually, in a single piece, 
containing all expenditures and sources of revenue. It also contains the investment 
projects of state enterprises which also need to be approved by the legislators. 
8 Social security in Brazil encompasses pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, 
and social assistance. Private pension schemes are very limited and the public sector is 
the main provider of pensions and of health care in the country. 
9 In the table direct taxes are those based on income, property, payroll, and inheritance 
taxes, and indirect taxes are those based on transactions of goods and services. 
10 For a detailed explanation and analysis of fiscal federalism in Brazil, see Afonso and 
Mello (2000), Serra and Afonso (1999), and Shah (1990) and (1994). 
11 Ministry of Planning and Budget (2003). 
12 In 2004 “small” businesses were defined to be those businesses with annual sales up to 
R$ 1.2 million. 
13 Financial compensations in the oil industry have two main components: royalties – up 
to 10% of the gross value of production and an additional compensation in the case of 
good-quality high productivity oil wells which are charged a percentage of net income 
(profits) varying from 10% to 40%. Detailed information regarding financial 
compensation in the oil industry can be found in http://www.anp.gov.br. 
14 From the site: 
http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/speedofthought/additional/brazil.asp. 
 
15 The balance of payments data are from Banco Central do Brasil (Brazilian Central 
Bank), available at www.bcb.gov.br. 
16 Hermann (2005), p.110. 
17 An analysis of the II PND’s roll in the 1983-1984 external adjustment can be found in 
Castro e Souza (1985). 
18 Giambiagi and Além (2000), p.136. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Brazil adopts in its official statistics the concept of net public debt, which is the result 
of comparing the financial public sector plus Central Bank’s liabilities with its assets. In 
this concept the monetary base is included. 
21 A characterization of the inflation debate can be found in Castro (2005). 
22 For the theory of inertial inflation, see Lopes (1986). 
23 A discussion of the crawling-peg exchange rate system can be found in Zini Jr (1992). 
24 Source Brazilian Central Bank. Available at www.bcb.gov.br. 
25 A detailed analysis of the Brady Plan conditions for Brazil can be found in Portella 
Filho (1994). 
26 For a description of Real Plan see Castro (2005). An analysis of the origins of Real 
Plan can be found in Franco (1995). 
27 An analysis of the inflation-targeting system and its results can be found in Fachada 
(2001) and Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003). 
28 For an analysis of the reform of the state and the privatization of state-owned 
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